Is this Religious Freedom?

(updated in July 2014)

Patrick Kar-wai Poon

Committee Member and Coordinator of China Affairs Group,

Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese

The Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese submitted a stakeholder’s report¹ for the UN Human Rights Council’s second Universal Periodic Review on China in 2013. The following presentation is roughly based on the information we included in the report and I have also included some updates in this presentation.

Catholicism is one of the five recognized religions in China, the other four being Protestantism, Buddhism, Taoism and Muslim. Since 1950s, the Catholic Church in China has been sadly divided into two families – the officially sanctioned Church registered with the government and headed by the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) and the Bishop Conference of the Catholic Church in China (BCCCC) and the underground Church community which refuses to register with the government. According to Chinese government statistics, there are about 7 million Catholics in China, while China observers estimate that the figure should be much higher by including underground Church members.

While I would like to concentrate on the situation of Catholics in China, I would also like to say a few words about the worrying situation of human rights activists in China as freedom of religion and freedom of expression are closely connected. Since Xi Jinping became president of the People’s Republic of China, there have been increasing crackdowns against human rights defenders, even including the moderate ones who merely exercised their freedom of expression, in the excuse of so-called “maintaining social stability”. To name a few activists who have been recently detained, arrested and sentenced, for example, the representatives of the New Citizens Movement who initiated anti-corruption campaigns: Beijing legal scholar Xu Zhiyong was imprisoned for four years and several other representatives were also sentenced to 2 – 6.5 years imprisonments. On 13 June 2014, human rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang was formally arrested for “picking quarrels and creating trouble” and “illegally obtaining personal information” after he attended a gathering together with about a dozen other public intellectuals and Tiananmen Mothers in early May to commemorate the 25^th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown. The situation of Catholics hasn’t improved after Xi Jinping took power as many bishops and priests of the “underground Church” remain detained. I will give more details later in my presentation.

Restrictions on Government-sanctioned Catholic Church

Although the Catholic Church resumed activities in early 1980s after the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976 and Beijing initiated the “open door policy” in 1978, there have been endless disputes among people who are concerned about the situations of the Catholic Church in China. Experts on Catholic Church in China, such as Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kun (retired bishop of Hong Kong Diocese) and Belgian scholar priest Fr. Jeroom Heyndrickx, acting director of Ferdinand Verbiest Institute of Catholic University of Leuven, have been strongly debating how the government-sanctioned Catholic communities should maintain their faith while dealing with the Chinese government’s various restrictions on the Church in China and how the Vatican should react. Cardinal Zen reminds Catholics in China and the Vatican that we should firmly follow the Church’s principles and Canon Law while Fr. Heyndrickx and some overseas China Church observers and some clergies belonged to the official Church in China plead for compromise in some principles for the sake of “development” of the Church in China. We have to bear in mind that these disputes actually manifest the effect of the Chinese government’s control of the Catholic Church in China and it is exactly what the Chinese government wants to see the splits within the Catholic community in China and between those who support the Catholic Church in China.

Among all the disputes, the most controversial issue, however, is the appointments of bishops. Appointments of bishops can affect a local diocese’s development for decades. If young clergies in their 40s who submit to government control become bishops of their dioceses, the local Church communities will encounter very difficult situations. In some cases, the clergies and lay Catholics are split among themselves on whether they should accept these new bishops and attend Mass liturgies celebrated by them. Between November 2010 and July 2012, four illicit ordinations occurred in Chengde (承德) Diocese in Hebei province (河北省), Leshan (樂山) Diocese in Sichuan province (四川省), Shantou (汕頭) Diocese in Guangdong province (廣東省) and Harbin (哈爾濱) Apostolic Administration in Heilongjiang province (黑龍江省). Some bishops of other dioceses were forced to concelebrate the installation ceremony while some were lured by monetary rewards to attend it. It also created distrust among the clergies and lay Catholics in the diocese.

Another event which created much distrust among Church people of the government-sanctioned Church was the Eighth National Congress of Catholic Representatives. Dozens of bishops were forced to attend the meeting while some were lured to attend it as the government offered to give them financial assistance to help their dioceses’ development, according to sources. It again created much distrust within the government-sanctioned Church community, especially among the bishops, the priests and lay Catholics in their dioceses who felt very much confused on how to follow Catholic principles. By attending such a meeting organized by the government-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association, it sent a very wrong message to the Catholic Church community in China and the Vatican that the bishops who attended the meeting recognized the legitimate control of the Catholic Patriotic Association. Afterall, we need to ask one question: is it really religious freedom when the government has exerted so much control on the administration of Church affairs?

Oppression of the “Underground” Catholic Church

Since bishops and priests of the “Underground” Catholic Church refuse to be controlled by the government by refusing to register with the Catholic Patriotic Association, many bishops and priests have been subjected to crackdowns and harassments over the years. According to information collected by the Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, nearly 20 clergies in Hebei province have been illegally detained, tortured or forced to join political “classes”.

The horrible cases of torture and ill-treatment include: 1) In September 2007, Father Yu Zhongxun (宇中勛) was hanged to a basketball stand overnight and he was subjected to various torture, including being tied to a “Tigar Chair” (老虎櫈) for more than 10 days, hurt by cigarette butts, forced to drink chili water (灌辣椒水); 2) in June 2009, during the last six days of his six-month detention, Father Liu Jianzhong (劉建忠) was not allowed to sleep and he was made to stand in a pose a soldier, squat and push up for more than 10 hours every day.

Hebei province is traditionally a stronghold of the Catholic community in China, especially “underground” Catholics, probably due to the fact that many European missionaries preached in the area during Ming and Qing Dynasties. 1) One of the most famous cases is Bishop Su Zhemin (alias Su Zhimin) (蘇哲民) of Baoding Diocese in Hebei province, who is now 82 years old. Bishop Su was arrested at a lay Catholic’s house in Xinji city, near Shijiazhuang on 8 October 1997. After the arrest, he was held in detention in Qingyuan County, Baoding. For years, nothing was heard of him. Bishop Su had previously been arrested for at least five times and imprisoned for nearly 27 years.

2) Another example is Father Lu Genjun (鹿根君) of the same diocese. Father Lu and another priest Father Guo Yanli were arrested when they were receiving a friend at Baoding railroad station on 17 February 2006. Father Guo was sent to Xushui detention center in Hebei and his current situation was not clear. Father Lu’s whereabouts are still unknown.

3) Bishop Shi Enxiang (師恩祥) of Yixian (易縣) diocese in Hebei, who is now 93 years old, had tried to hide himself from being detained since 1996 but he disappeared after he was seen in Beijing on Good Friday on 13 April 2001. Nothing was heard of him since then. He has previously spent 30 years in prison.

4) Bishop Zhao Kexun (趙克勛) of Xuanhua (宣化) diocese in Hebei, who is over 80 years old, has been hiding in various places and cannot exercise his duty as a bishop publicly.

5) In August 2004, Father Ma Yongwu (馬勇武) of Baoding (保定) diocese in Hebei was taken away when he was celebrating the first anniversary of his ordination as a priest. He was later released but was detained again when he took part in Father Chen Baidu’s (陳百都) funeral. He has since been detained in Qingyuan county (青苑縣) in Hebei.

6) On 27 December 2006, Father Liu Honggen (劉紅更) of Baoding (保定) diocese in Hebei was taken away together with six other priests in Xinanzuo village (西南佐村) in Qingyuan county (青苑縣) in Hebei. The other priests were later released by Father Liu remains being detained.

7) In 2011, three young priests in Hebei were taken away. In mid-March 2011, Father Wang Lifang (王立芳) of Zhengding (正定) diocese was cheated by plainclothes officers to perform sacraments for the sick and he was then taken away. Another 40-year-old priest Father Zhang Guangjun (張廣軍) was taken away in mid-January 2011 and he was not allowed to sleep for five days during detention and had been subjected to ill-treatment and insult. He was briefly released during the Chinese New Year in 2011 and then was taken away again on 8 March 2011. It was believed that he was tortured again. His whereabouts remain unknown. Father Chen Hailong (陳海龍), a 32-year-old priest who was ordained in 2009, of Xuanhua (宣化) diocese was taken away on 8 April 2011 by plainclothes when he was travelling with two young people to visit Catholics.

8) Auxiliary Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin of Shanghai diocese announced at the installation ceremony in July 2012 that he resigned from all his positions at the Catholic Patriotic Association. He was taken away that afternoon and disappeared for some time. He was later “arranged” to stay at Sheshan Seminary in Shanghai. Until now, he still cannot publicly and freely exercise his duty as an auxiliary bishop.

Support needed

The above-mentioned situations and cases are only the tip of the iceberg. There might be more unknown situations of control on the government-sanctioned Church and more unknown cases of harassments of underground Church people. We, the Justice and Peace Commission, together with other organisations and individuals will continue to call for more attention and support to the Catholic Church in China, both the open and underground Church communities. At the same time, we also pay attention to the harassments of protestant house church members and other faith communities.

________________________________________________

1 See the Commission’s report: https://uprdoc.ohchr.org/uprweb/downloadfile.aspx?filename=121&file=EnglishTranslation

Boiling Frog in Warm Water? We are Right in the Boiling Water!

Patrick Poon the Naive and Stupid

Half a million people in Hong Kong took to street on 1 July 2003 to protest against the anti-subversion law proposed by the Hong Kong government based on Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law – Hong Kong’s mini-constitution. The big turnout shocked not only the Hong Kong government, but also the generally politically indifferent Hong Kong public, since it was then only seven years after Hong Kong’s handover from British colonial rule to China.

The mass turnout manifested Hong Kong people’s fear of losing basic freedoms, such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, and Beijing’s promise of maintaining “One Country, Two Systems” as highlighted in the “Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong” signed in 1984, which is also commonly known as “Sino-British Joint Declaration” and incorporated into Hong Kong laws.

One of the more obvious reasons was that a number of Hong Kong people used to flee from Mainland China in the 1950s – 1970s where they or their parents experienced a lot of hardships during the “Three Years of Great Chinese Famine”, “Anti-Rightists Movement”, and “Cultural Revolution”. In addition, the Tiananmen Square crackdown on 4 June 1989 also fueled more fear of Communist rule among Hong Kong people.

Nevertheless, as ever people on the move, Hong Kong people are very pragmatic. Despite all these fears, most of us quickly became amnesiac and swiftly embraced doing business in China again, in particular through exploiting cheap labour in Mainland China and making hot money through the property market. History? Fear? Freedom? All these simply are not as sexy as the smelly RMB notes.

Nearly eleven years have passed. China has become the second largest economy in the world. What we have been hearing from the Chinese officials or those pro-Beijing figures in Hong Kong who are afraid of not pleasing the Chinese Communist Party enough to become a member of the small circle Election Committee of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong or gaining a place as a member of the Political Consultative Committee in Beijing or even in a small city in Guangdong. Being a rich, obedient and shameless pro-Beijing figure is considered to be more respectful that those who take to street to fight for freedom and democracy.

We can no longer rely on the elites who are in their 50s or 60s to fight for freedom and democracy as vested interests, either monetary or political, have eroded their passion for real grassroots pro-democracy movements. “Three Years of Great Famine”? “Anti-rightist Movement”? “Cultural Revolution”? “Tiananmen Square crackdown”? Come on, these people now just think they are “historical events”. These “historical events” could be selectively studied in schools. But these people would complain why some people are so persistent in recalling these “historical events”. To these people, money and economic interests are definitely always more important than “history” and “fact”.

Most of us, who are in our 30s or 40s and well-educated, are having lots of excuses of being busy with family and providing the “best education” for children (or showing off to help children to enter international schools or elite schools?). Yes, many claim that they are “concerned” about “social issues” and “national issues” (don’t know why just “national issues” but not “global issues – aren’t we in Internet age? Are we still waiting for Columbus to explore the New World for us? Aren’t we using WhatsApp, Facebook and/or Instagram, etc, to communicate with our friends all over the world?), BUT (oh yes, I need a capitalized “BUT” here as all these excuses – oh, sorry, I shouldn’t say that these are excuses. I’m so mean and inconsiderate. Shame on me!) they cannot sacrifice their time of doing the realistic things, such as finding their children a really nice and elite schools, for doing something “unrealistic and naive”, such as taking to street to fight for freedom and democracy. Freedom and democracy are important to their children? Ah, yes. They might think they are, but it shouldn’t be THEY who are so well-educated and better-off to take part in THESE ACTIVITIES. Some would even say: “Well, Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997. That’s a fact. We can’t do anything to change it. What’s point of taking part in demonstrations? They are useless!!!!!”

So, what is left? Who can we rely on in our society who are not afraid or don’t think too much about their own interests? Shamelessly, we relied on a large group of brave and selfless secondary school students to take the lead. Yes, they are students but they are more brave, knowledgeable and genuine than many self-sufficient adults like us. The most prominent among these students groups is “Scholarism”. Such a good name. Many of them are brighter than many so-called scholars. Over the past two years, we relied so much on their efforts in reminding so many people in Hong Kong that we need to treasure the freedoms we used to them for granted.

So, it’s now early March 2014. We have seen so much violence and increasing censorship against the media – the most recent one of Kevin Lau, former chief editor of Mingpao, who was stabbed at daytime and is now still lying in the intensive care unit. (Oh, well. Right. Some pro-Beijing figures would claim that it has nothing to do with media censorship. Do we really believe that shit? Excuse my lowly-educated language.) And, Beijing officials are telling us that there are such and such and such and such and such…pre-conditions for universal suffrage in Hong Kong. And, although China is still not yet a democratic country – no direct election, judicial independence and not to even mention separation of powers, Beijing officials, many of whom didn’t even study law or international law, self-sufficiently tell us that many of us, Hong Kong people, don’t understand the bloody  (oh, yes, sorry for my language again and I’m not THAT “civilized” in the Mainland Chinese official sense as I didn’t study Communism, Marxism and Socialism in China) HONG KONG BASIC LAW and the bloody (oh, sorry) INTERPRETATIONS of THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS (again, sorry for my bloody, er, sorry, lowly educated language that has degraded the “honourably” “bloody” (er, sorry again) and “respectable” “shitty” (oops, sorry!) “GRANDPA” – the Central Government).

So, “boiling frog in warm water”? Who invented this stupid phrase? (Oh, sorry, I’m so naive and stupid to be so cynical.) I’m spending so much time to write this shitty piece to try to understand if we are being “boiled in warm water”? No, I feel that we are JUST (sorry for the capital letters, I don’t mean to be a drama queen…) right in the boiling water! Anyway, who care about this shitty piece and who care about freedom and democracy? Tomorrow will be another busy day for better-off parents to take their children to various weekend classes to gain points of swimming, dancing, painting or playing the piano, and another busy day for making money, and another busy day for us to listen to the shitty (oh, sorry, I’m just so shamelessly uneducated) speeches of the “honourable” Beijing officials and their servants.

應立即停止指鹿為馬

應立即停止指鹿為馬

2014年2月16日發表於香港公教報「義筆容辭」專欄

博 德

特首梁振英因為民望低落，他所說的話經常成為笑柄，無法令人相信他的話能代表中央政府立場，因此經常出現如吳康民、譚惠珠和梁愛詩等親北京人物紛紛跳出來解釋中央對香港普選的立場。在現在的香港政府官員中，以政務司司長林鄭月娥民望最高，她當了多年政務官，當她在去年十二月為政府展開的所謂為期五個月的政改諮詢解說時，顯示的是官話連連，佯裝持平。一方面說要按基本法規定，普選要循序漸進；一方面強調要依從全國人大常委會的決定；一方面又說必須確保普選行政長官的產生辦法符合國家對香港的基本方針政策；然而，最動聽的是「兼顧社會各階層的利益」、「有利於資本主義的發展」、「適合香港實際情況」。

林鄭月娥作為最高級的政治任命官員，我們當然不要天真地認為，她在談論對政改看法的時候，只會考慮法律、政制和法治的問題，而沒有考慮如何取悅中央。不幸地，筆者感覺林鄭月娥的言論愈來愈像中國大陸的官員，內容空洞、官僚、只懂為中央政府說話，目的只是要香港人相信指鹿為馬的言論，若是在香港為香港人普選特首和立法會著想，何以看不見任何具體措施讓我們一般香港市民參與提名候選人，最近卻甚至說出三百萬人也並非有代表性的荒謬言論。在香港沒有像一般民主制度有政黨輪替的情況下，提名委員會如何能確保香港市民有提名權呢？自二OO三年五十萬人上街要求普選，多年來香港市民要求的還不夠清楚了嗎？要的是現在皇恩浩瀚的五個月所謂諮詢？香港人要的選舉權，在沒有政黨輪替作黨內初選情況下，選舉權應該包括提名權，現在的所謂諮詢卻以所謂符合《基本法》第四十五條規定限制為提名委員會，但以往幾屆特首都是小圈子產生，試問如何令市民相信這個提名委員會能有基本法同樣規定的「具有廣泛代表性」？五個月的諮詢能解決這個關鍵問題嗎？這不是硬要人相信指鹿為馬嗎？

在說出這些指鹿為馬的言論後，也請林鄭月娥不要自覺清高地說甚麼香港政府很有誠意，政府向市民表達不應是誠意，而應該是顯示誠信，否則不斷說出有如中國內地官員常見的虛偽和虛假的官話，像湖南政府說李旺陽是「自殺」，又或像最近山東曲阜政府說維權人士薛明凱父親薛福順在當地檢察院據理力爭時突然「跳樓自殺」，這樣如何取信於民？林鄭月娥最近向傳媒表示她無意參與二O一七年特首選舉，理應不會考慮自己的政治利益，若她不想成為像現任特首梁振英和發展局局長陳茂波那樣誠信破產，那她應該立即停止指鹿為馬的言論，具體說明如何確保市民在二O一七年普選特首有提名權，而非虛假的諮詢。

正義和平委員會

www.hkjp.org

《正義和平通訊》「中國內望」專欄：從薄熙來案看中國法治問題

發表於香港天主教正義和平委員會 《正義和平通訊》2013年10月號「中國內望」專欄：

從薄熙來案看中國法治問題

潘嘉偉
香港天主教正義和平委員會委員、國是組召集人

文章連結：http://www.hkjp.org/files/files/enews/hkjp_Sep2013_p12-13_preview.pdf

The Human Rights Implications of China’s Slowdown

Published in The Diplomat on September 20, 2013

By Su-Mei Ooi and Patrick Poon

China’s economic slowdown will have an adverse impact on human rights. In fact, it already is.

 

Since Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang took power in March, activists in China have come under increasing pressure from authorities. As more and more detentions and arrests took place over the summer, human rights defenders have come to expect further violations of civil and political rights. The pattern of recent violations and its correspondence with a slowdown in economic growth seems to suggest that any further economic trouble is likely to have a negative impact on human rights in the near term.

 

Among those most recently detained have been human rights defenders, the most renowned of whom is Dr. Xu Zhiyong, founder of the now-banned NGO Open Constitution Initiative (Gongmengand, later, Gongmin), which provided legal assistance to disempowered groups seeking redress for official abuse. Xu is also co-founder of the New Citizens’ Movement, a loosely connected network of human rights defenders, dissidents and ordinary citizens, who since 2012 have been demanding that government officials disclose their wealth. Their appeal is actually in line with President Xi’s efforts to crack down on corruption and impose austerity measures on government officials, but Xu’s arrest now raises questions about this commitment, and suggests that China is becoming even less tolerant of dissent than before.

 

Formerly a lecturer in law at Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications and a visiting scholar at Yale Law School, Xu’s detention on 16 July attracted immediate international attention. He was previously detained for three weeks in late July 2009 after Gongmeng was shut down and fined 1.4 million yuan for failing to pay taxes. Prior to his recent detention, Xu, deemed a threat to stability, had already been placed under house arrest for three months while the NPC and CPPCC held meetings. International interest in his case is due in part to the fact that Xu’s arrest on suspicion of “assembling a crowd to disrupt order in a public place” seems incomprehensible. Xu’s role in the New Citizens’ Movement is better likened to spiritual leadership in calling for citizens’ participation in pro-establishment actions. In a blog post explaining his vision for a “New Citizens’ Movement” on May 29, Xu wrote that the political movement was not meant to encourage the overthrow of the current regime, but to build a civil society that “will do away with tyranny.”

 

According to information compiled by Chinese media expert and online activist Wen Yunchao, and Xu’s friend and legal scholar-activist Teng Biao, more than 100 dissidents have been detained or arrested in the first six months of this year. About a fifth of them took part in the New Citizens’ Movement, while 38 others were taken into custody for organizing and participating in other public collective actions not directly related to the New Citizens Movement. The number of detained activists is increasing, with the latest being well-known Guangdong rights activist Guo Feixiong, aka Yang Maodong, who was detained on August 8 on suspicion of “disrupting public order.” Guo had helped organize a signature campaign to urge the National People’s Congress to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in March.

 

This wave of arrests and detentions of activists that emphasize citizens’ rights and call for greater government accountability is telling. China has been experiencing a slowdown in economic growth for the last five quarters. Projected fears of what the future holds for China’s economy might explain heightened sensitivities to grassroots demands to deal seriously with seemingly intractable governance issues that are likely to drag seriously on growth when investment-led strategies are no longer feasible. On the one hand, any serious fight against corruption will require the support of party elders in the CPC; on the other, the failure to grapple with the problem over the years has already begun to spook international investors. It may therefore seem necessary to muzzle voices that call for too much too quickly, when heightened expectations generated by Xi’s own rhetoric cannot realistically be met. As many more start to feel the squeeze of a slowing economy, these demands might also find resonance with a growing social base.

 

In the face of economic trouble, China’s leaders have also had to seriously consider how China’s economy can be rebalanced away from investment-led growth towards a version that is driven by consumption. After many false starts, this necessary task promises to be complicated and fraught with political difficulty, and all eyes are now on the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, scheduled for November. Many remain skeptical that real economic reform will take place precisely because of the kinds of changes necessitated by the rebalancing. Reform of China’s financial sector, state enterprises and the hukou system are just some areas that will create conflicts of interest at a juncture where the new administration has still to consolidate its power base. Rebalancing China’s economy is also easier said than done. A comfortable middle class with disposable income is indispensable to the consumption-led growth model, yet such a middle class is missing in China. While rolling back state-owned enterprises in the economy might mean greater space for resource-starved small and medium enterprises to thrive as a basis for consumption-led growth, a tightening of monetary policy could at the same time create a cash crunch that would affect middle-income business development adversely. Ultimately, rebalancing will require that both investment and consumption decelerate in the short term, making it extremely difficult to continue delivering on even current rates of growth. In the face of such political and economic uncertainty, the last thing that China’s top leadership now needs is activists who frame past policy failures in terms of the “tyranny” of an oligarchic government. As such, more crackdowns can be expected.

 

The real reason why China’s economic slowdown is likely to negatively impact human rights domestically lies not with the fact that demands for government accountability draw negative attention to governance issues that cannot be effectively dealt with in the immediate term or difficult reforms that might not work out. In truth, it is not only the legitimacy of Xi’s administration that will be called into question if such demands cannot be met, but the “performance legitimacy” of the CPC to date. This is because, some of the greatest threats to the future of China’s economic prosperity lies with the pathologies of China’s investment-led growth model, one of which is of course endemic corruption. Understanding China’s economic slowdown as merely an instance of inevitable middle-income trap that requires a rebalancing of the economy toward consumer driven growth is to miss the more disturbing structural problems that cast a dark shadow over China’s economic future.

One of the key pathologies is that of overwhelming local government debt, which is causing real concern about the overall state of China’s financial sector. A 2010 audit report found that the 10.7 trillion yuan debt was caused by at times questionable infrastructural investment decisions made by local officials, whose career advancement prospects are dependent upon short term growth, along with official excesses following the 2008 credit binge. This debt continued to grow, rising 13% by 2012, after Beijing’s clean-up order, as spending on infrastructure and development projects continued – despite diminishing returns on investment. The National Audit Office has since been charged by the State Council to conduct an urgent audit in July, as serious doubts surface about just how much of this debt consists of bad loans. In the meantime, a 2012 Amnesty International report already suggests that instances of violent forced evictions have increased as local officials seek to offset huge debts by seizing and selling land to property developers. As forced evictions, poor social programs and environmental problems continue for the sake of dubious developmental projects, dissatisfaction with the government will rise and activists such as Xu will continue to call for greater governmental accountability, necessitating tighter controls over dissent.

 

China’s economic slowdown has already had and will continue to have negative implications for human rights in the near future. It is indeed ironic that at such a time, China is preparing to bid for re-election to the United Nations Human Rights Council in November.

 

Su-Mei Ooi is assistant professor of political science at Butler University, where she teaches International Relations and Asian politics. Patrick Poon is a PhD Candidate in the Faculty of Law at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and was Executive Secretary of the China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group. 

示威集會權利被日漸抹黑

示威集會權利被日漸抹黑

2013年8月25日發表於香港公教報「義筆容辭」專欄

潘嘉偉

近日接二連三的街頭事件，令警民關係緊張再次成為焦點，不得不慨嘆一句，香港政府與香港社會是否患了重病？特首梁振英、警方、政府官員和建制派人士不斷放話把市民參與示威及街頭活動渲染成不和平與鬧事，甚至縱容親建制人士及疑似黑社會人士挑釁參與街頭活動的市民，香港市民受《基本法》第二十七條保障的遊行集會自由正有被日漸侵蝕的趨勢。

小學老師林慧思因目睹法輪功學員在旺角行人專用區擺檔被親建制的香港青年關愛協會（簡稱「青關會」）騷擾，路見不平，對警方縱容青關會成員騷擾非常不滿，在與現場警員說理的時候衝口而出說了一句粗言穢語，隨即被網上傳播，鋪天蓋地般被批評和攻擊，其後，更引發至八月四日香港家長聯會會長李偲嫣、退休前休假的警司劉達強等人在旺角站台批評林慧思，現場批評和支持林老師的公眾情況緊張，但竟然有休班警員被發現懷疑推撞記者和支持林老師的市民。

在一週後的星期日八月十一日，特首梁振英到天水圍落區出席地區論壇，但其表現完全不是聽取市民意見，場內絕大多數是挺梁振英人士，而梁振英向市民說的卻是吩咐教育局局長吳克儉就林老師事件提交報告，不禁令人懷疑為甚麼針對一位老師的做法那麼徹底，即使林老師當時在警員面前衝口而出說了一句髒話，有必要把事件提升到要局長就此提交報告嗎？

更甚的是，梁振英竟然在這個所謂地區論壇為被廉署調查的前行政會議成員林奮強和張震遠呼冤，說廉署已證明對兩人的指控證據不足，但舉報二人的政黨卻沒有「私下或公開說一句半句抱歉」，市民有義務舉報懷疑觸犯貪污的案件，調查證據應是廉署的責任，怎能怪責和要求市民或政黨因廉署沒有找到證據而要就舉報案件道歉，那樣還有誰會敢於舉報懷疑貪污的案件？除了場內只有梁振英講沒有機會讓市民發言之外，場外更有參與示威的市民被懷疑是黑社會人士毆打，警方卻只說場內秩序良好和場外有零星示威，最後有幾名人士分別以普通襲擊、涉嫌公眾地方行為不檢和襲警被捕。

執筆當天八月十八日，梁振英又再次落區到觀塘一間中學出席地區論壇，場外再次有大批市民抗議，警方如臨大敵派出大批警員維持秩序，筆者在現場所見參與示威的市民都十分守秩序，但竟然有六名人士被捕。筆者感到梁振英落區的做法令市民與警察之間產生更強烈的對峙感，在現場的示威者與撐梁振英的建制派人士很容易發生互相挑釁的行為。梁振英及其班子在民望低迷的情況再繼續這樣落區做騷，得到的效果只是令參與示威集會的市民感到隨時要與身份撲朔迷離的疑似建制派人士對峙，同時又擔心警方會怎樣對待示威人士，在這樣複雜的情況下，不論示威有多和平理性，參與示威的市民很容易會被抹黑為搞事份子，令沉默的大多數更不敢參與集會示威，間接令示威集會權利進一步被削弱。

七十後公民，出來吧！

原來很討厭把人分年齡階層，但香港近幾年的社會發展，無不令我想想年齡和成長的年代背景是否影響了公民意識和公民參與。

我們七十後這一代，我覺得因為成長年代的背景，使我們不像八十後和九十後那樣形成至少一些主動走出來關注社會和參與社會行動的領頭人物。

最近有跟幾位八十後朋友聊天談及這個問題，我不懂分析七十後普遍較少參與社運的原因，或許是因為香港八十年代和九十年代初經濟蓬勃，我們這一代幸運地在香港最富庶的年代成長，物質的充裕令我們對政治不感興趣，又或許是因為我們中學時代還是殖民地時代，政治冷感彷彿是理所當然。

九十年代末上的大學時候，甚至感到學生會的同學太激進，安份守己地讀書和享受大學幾年無拘無束的日子，大家都覺得是理所當然的。

七十後出生的到現在這個年紀不少都已婚和有小孩，出來參與社會運動和政治運動，看來心裡都覺得好像不太成熟，像我這樣被動地參與社會運動的，或許會被同輩和老一輩認為不切實際，空談理想，有些甚至以為我要參政。公民參與和參政，對我們這一代和我們上一代的人來說，好像甚難理解。

如今看見香港的所謂特首梁振英，他不是我們公民選出來的，他現在做甚麼，說甚麼，難道我們就沒有一點感覺？再看陳茂波，他對著市民一次又一次撒謊。試問香港政府官員，我們還能相信哪一位？

我只是一名關注社會和香港民主發展的普通公民，懇切希望我們七十後這一代，能有一些領袖人物出來，帶領我們和充滿希望的八十後和九十後年青人，甚至是2000年後出生的年輕人，一起成為真正的公民，關心政治，為香港政治前景出一分力。希望六十後和五十後的前輩朋友也不要忘了成為真正的公民。

檢視中國大陸的言論自由

（發表於香港「民間人權陣線」 《民陣十年－－700萬人的故事》）

檢視中國大陸的言論自由

潘嘉偉
獨立中文筆會常務秘書

獨立中文筆會是全世界用中文寫作、編輯、翻譯、研究和出版文學作品人士的非政府、非營利、非政黨跨國界組織。獨立中文筆會於2001年由一批流亡中文作家及中國國內作家創立，創會成員中，首任主席劉賓雁曾被前美國筆會主席、著名作家阿瑟‧米勒（Arthur Miller）稱為「中國良心」；前會長鄭義是八十年代「反思文學」先驅者之一；2010年諾貝爾和平獎得主劉曉波曾任兩屆會長。其他曾擔任理事的著名作家包括：六十年代已活躍於民間文學創作的四川《野草》詩社主要詩人蔡楚、作家余杰、作家廖亦武、詩人孟浪、小說家馬建和詩人楊煉等。

獨立中文筆會於2001年在倫敦舉行的第67屆國際筆會代表大會中獲接納為國際筆會下屬分會，現時約有三百名會員，百分之六十在中國大陸。由於會員在世界不同角落，會員主要透過互聯絡作文學和言論自由等議題的交流。獨立中文筆會一直與國際筆會及其他筆會在國際社會呼籲要求中國釋放所有獄中作家，並為獄中作家及其家屬提供人道援助，舉辦週年頒獎禮以肯定中國及其他身處沒有言論自由國家的作家，舉辦與言論自由相關的文學研討會，以及出版關於獄中作家的書籍及選輯出版部分中國大陸異見作家的作品。國際筆會是世界上歷史最悠久的人權組織和國際性組織，1921年由一班著名作家在倫敦成立，致力維護全球作家的言論和寫作自由，維護世界各地因從事其專業工作而遭監禁、威嚇、迫害或打壓的作家和新聞工作者的權益。國際筆會現時有146個下屬分會，於聯合國教科文組織和聯合國經濟社會理事會擁有非政府組織諮詢地位。

香港在九七回歸中國後，香港言論自由的狀況與中國大陸的言論自由狀況息息相關，而香港言論自由長遠能否得以維持又與普選是否得以落實有不可分割的關係。二零零三年七月一日，五十萬香港人上街遊行反對《基本法》二十三條立法，不但激起了香港人關心言論自由的問題，在烈日當空下遊行仍秩序井然，並最終令香港政府擱置立法，亦令中國大陸不少異見人士對那麼多香港人為了爭取保持自由走出來羨慕不已。獨立中文筆會在香港只有約十位會員，但差不多每年都有參與七一遊行，拉著「要求釋放獄中作家，捍衛言論自由」的橫額走入遊行隊伍中。對中國大陸的異見人士來說，香港人走出來捍衛自己的自由具有十分重要的指標性意義。《基本法》二十三條所涵蓋的關於國家安全的條文，正正就是內地異見人士，特別是異見作家及維權人士，常常面對被捕和被起訴的罪名－－「煽動顛覆國家政權罪」。這條罪名內容含糊，讓公安及檢察機關輕易引用，以所謂「維護國家穩定」為藉口，處罰批評政府的人士。

因「煽動顛覆國家政權罪」曾被判刑或現仍在獄中的著名異見作家或維權人士多不勝數，維權人士之間簡稱這條罪名為「煽顛」。因撰寫六篇文章批評北京奧運及官員貪腐的維權人士胡佳，他於二零零八年四月被判刑三年半，刑滿出獄後繼續受到看守人員在家外嚴密監視，他仍然積極參與關注其他維權人士的狀況，並因此繼續備受打壓；二零零八年五月四川汶川大地震後，維權人士譚作人因為揭露「豆腐渣工程」問題，卻突然因為幾篇數年前寫關於六四的文章被控「煽顛」，判刑五年；北京作家劉曉波因為參與起草呼籲政治改革、改善人權與法治的《零八憲章》，被重判十一年監禁，妻子劉霞大部分時間被軟禁在家，兩夫婦同樣失去自由，劉曉波獲得2010年諾貝爾和平獎後，中國政府甚至對劉霞進一步監控，除了被軟禁在家，更被切斷與外界的聯絡，無法上網或以手機聯絡，甚至突然抓捕和起訴劉霞弟弟劉暉「詐騙」，中國政府看來是想以各種方式折磨劉霞，迫使劉曉波離開中國。

像胡佳、譚作人和劉曉波這樣因為「煽顛」被捕或坐牢的人有增加趨勢，有些甚至只是在網上發表意見或轉發微博的普通老百姓。據獨立中文筆會收集的資料，至今仍有37名獄中作家，當中大部分包括曾在網上發表文章批評政府的作家，也包括在二零零八年三月十四日在西藏拉薩反抗中國政府行動後傳播訊息的藏族作家，以及在二零零九年七月五日在新疆烏魯木齊抗議事件後傳播訊息的維吾爾族作家。

當大家擔心香港政府會重提《基本法》第二十三條立法，我們必須要認清和承認一個事實，我們要面對的不是梁振英這個傀儡特首或以為自己「好打得」的林鄭月娥或其他香港政府官員或只懂為自身利益奉承中央的建制派人士，而是經歷了多次政治挑戰而仍然當權的中國共產黨。故此，不論是港獨或本土派，大家都要承認政治現實，我們的對手是這個製造過無數文字獄和政活鬥爭的中共政權。不論我們情感上是否願意具體認識中國大陸，除了空泛地或不屑一顧地說中國大陸沒有法治，甚或認為中國大陸因為有法不依而所以他們的法律不值一提，但筆者認為只有知己知彼，我們才能有效應對。因此，當我們在爭取香港普選的同時，我們要以中國大陸現在的言論自由和獄中作家的狀況作為借鏡，同樣，若香港沒有普選，難保繼續由中央欽點的特首會堅持香港的言論自由，我們更無法肯定可以長遠享有言論自由，中國大陸的言論自由狀況則只會更進一步倒退。

人權GDP負増長

很榮幸我的拙作能發表在這本有81位作者關於中國人權的書–台灣關懷中國人權聯盟出版的＜中國生死書＞

人權GDP負増長

潘嘉偉
獨立中文筆會理事、常務秘書

在自由的社會裡，人權捍衛者備受尊崇，他們代表著社會的良心，媒體追訪的對像；但在中國，人權捍衛者遭受各種打壓，沒有言論自由，面對隨時被監視、傳喚、恐嚇、失蹤、毆打、軟禁、監視居住、勞動教養或監禁。

中國政府打壓異見份子及維權人手法層出不窮，真的可以用中國官員經常掛在口邊的說話來形容，深具「中國特色」。有些極權國家或軍政府政權，可能使用法外謀殺的手段消除異己，但中共已執政六十四年並經歷多次政治運動和公民抗命運動，卻仍屹立不倒，她採用的手段是製造白色恐怖，長期拘禁一些異見人士，以求達到殺雞儆猴和滅聲的效果。

筆者自大學畢業從事記者工作，最初擔任法庭記者工作時，每天進出法院，看到香港有司法獨立的可貴，隨後轉到一家天主教新聞機構工作，開始有機會親身接觸中國大陸的老百姓，採訪對像主要是中國天主教會人士，與他們的會面中，深深感受到他們宗教自由和個人自由受到的限制。

2004年開始，筆者全職投身人權組織工作，最初接觸的是勞工權益的問題，農民工從偏遠省份的鄉村千里迢迢地跑到沿海城市的工廠打工，與家人分隔千里，卻經常要超時工作，賺取微薄工資，有些更因為工作環境惡劣而不幸患上職業病。

及後，再轉到由香港立法會議員何俊仁、劉慧卿與幾位律師和大律師成立的中國維權律師關注組工作，關注的群體是當時正冒起而較少人關注的維權律師，他們面對的各種打壓，除了與其他維權人士一樣，人身自由受到限制，他們也甚至因為幫助其他維權人士、法輪功學員、訪民而失去執業權利，讓人覺得心寒。北京維權律師高智晟因為寫公開信呼籲中共領導人停止打壓法輪功學員，結果自己也身陷囹圄，不單被長期拘禁，並受到嚴重的酷刑對待，妻子和子女被迫流亡美國。山東失明維權人士陳光誠因揭露地方官員計劃生育強迫婦女墮胎，被莫須有罪名監禁，出獄後與妻子仍是被嚴密監視，甚至毆打，最終在眾多朋友協助下全家離開中國到紐約，但陳光誠在山東的姪兒陳克貴與大哥陳光福仍受到嚴重的報復和打擊。還有，為法輪功學員辯護而被司法局以破壞法庭秩序吊銷執業資格的唐吉田與劉巍；因為參與維權而被注銷執業資格的江天勇、滕彪、溫海波、唐荊陵等律師；各地近年興起發起律師互相救助的律師團等等，都可看出維權律師的處境有多險惡。

繼而在處理和跟進個案的過程中，筆者接觸到不少被以言入罪的作家與文字工作者，然後在朋友介紹下加入獨立中文筆會，進一步了解到中國言論自由狀況有多糟糕。好幾年前，在網上有幸與北京作家劉曉波有過短暫交流，但2008年12月8日，他便因為參與起草「零八憲章」被帶走，最後更以「煽動顛覆國家政權」被重判11年監禁，雖然他獲得2010年諾貝爾和平獎，但仍然被監禁，妻子劉霞仍是大部分時間被軟禁在家。很多其他維權人士同樣因為「煽動顛覆國家政權罪」、「顛覆國家政權罪」或「洩露國家機密」而被長期監禁，例如：南京的郭泉、楊天水、四川的譚作人、許萬成、山東的齊崇懷等等；還有因在網上發表關於藏民或維吾爾族被打壓的文章或訊息而以「煽動分裂國家罪」或「分裂國家罪」的藏族及維吾爾作家。據獨立中文筆會的資料，仍有約40位作家身在獄中，對言論自由的箝制，走在世界前列。

近年，中國政府每年都標榜GDP増長達百分之八或以上，2008年舉辦了北京奧運，2010年舉辦了上海世博，2012年又有了莫言獲得諾貝爾文學獎，各大城市高樓林立，表面看來繁華盛世，但監禁異見人士仍然繼續，現今已是全球第二大經濟體系的國民卻沒有言論自由，沒有網絡自由，要翻牆才能看「面書」和「推特」，「微博」隨時被刪賬號、被刪貼或被禁留言，多少經濟增長還不如對「維穩費」的遞增比例。這樣的國家，人權GDP只有不斷負増長。

Some Thoughts on Diplomatic Dialogue with China on Human Rights Issues

Patrick Poon

Because of my previous jobs on advocating for the rights of workers and human rights lawyers and my current job for fighting for the freedom of expression of writers, I have had many opportunities to meet with many diplomats to share my views on human rights situations in China.

From time to time, I get the impression that they are concerned whether they should adopt a more critical approach to criticize China’s appalling human rights records or focusing on the positive developments in China.

I am always skeptical about why we should focus on the positive developments while not addressing the deteriorating human rights records. My question is: China has now developed to become the second largest economy in the world. Why do we still want to hold double standards when we address the human rights problems in China with the usual excuse that “China is still not ready for legal and political reforms”?

Sometimes, I am very shocked to hear comments like we should appreciate that there have been more passionate and heated debates about new laws and policies among academics and officials, especially the younger ones who have studied overseas. Some people might believe these are positive signs. My another question is: “What about the implementation of these laws and policies?” I am puzzled to hear some comments that implementation is a separate issue.

I am sorry to say that but I do feel that some diplomats have missed the point and don’t understand Chinese politics. Of course, we have many reasons to be optimistic, including believing in the goodwill of some young and rising academics and officials. But are we telling the 1.3 billion people that they should believe in the less than 1 percent of elites and rely on them to hopefully make some progress in pushing for legal and political reforms?

While we recognize that there have been some improvements, we should not give in on any fundamental principle of universal human rights standards. Why should China be exempted? It is strange for diplomats from well developed democracies to accept China’s excuse to delay its commitment to legal and political reforms while acknowledging merely the small improvements. Remember, China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1998 but still hasn’t ratified it yet. If liberal democratic countries are only concerned about doing business with China and compromise on human rights concerns, what is the point of claiming to uphold the international human rights standards in the United Nations?